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Abstract
The textbook neoclassical growth model predicts that countries with faster productivity growth should invest more and 
attract more foreign capital. We show that the allocation of capital flows across developing countries is the opposite of 
this prediction: capital seems to flow more to countries that invest and grow less. We then introduce wedges into the 
neoclassical growth model and find that one needs a saving wedge in order to explain the correlation between growth 
and capital flows observed in the data. We conclude with a discussion of some possible avenues for research to resolve the 
contradiction between the model predictions and the data.
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The role of international capital ﬂows in economic development raises important open ques-
tions. In particular, the question asked by Robert Lucas almost twenty years ago—why so
little capital ﬂows from rich to poor countries—received renewed interest as capital has been
ﬂowing “upstream” from developing countries to the U.S. since 2000.1 This paper takes a
fresh look at the pattern of capital ﬂows to developing countries through the lenses of the
neoclassical growth model.
Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that there is a signiﬁcant discrepancy between
the predictions of the textbook neoclassical growth model for the distribution of capital
ﬂows across developing countries and the behavior of capital ﬂows in the data. The basic
framework predicts that countries that enjoy higher productivity growth should receive more
net capital inﬂows. We look at net capital inﬂows for a large sample of non-OECD countries
over the period 1980-2000 and ﬁnd that this is not true. In fact the cross-country correlation
between productivity growth and net capital inﬂows is negative. The non-OECD countries
that have grown at a higher rate over 1980-2000 have tended to export (not import) more
capital. The international capital market, thus, does not allocate capital across developing
countries in the way predicted by textbook theory—a fact that we call here the “allocation
puzzle”.
Our second contribution is to delineate the respective roles of investment and saving
in explaining this puzzle. We augment the neoclassical growth model with two “wedges”:
one wedge that distorts investment decisions, and one wedge that distorts saving decisions.
It is then possible, for each country in our sample, to estimate the saving and investment
wedges that are required to explain the observed levels of savings and investment (and so
capital ﬂows). We ﬁnd that the augmented model can explain the data with investment and
saving wedges of a plausible order of magnitude. Furthermore we ﬁnd that the investment
wedge cannot, by itself, explain the allocation puzzle. Solving the allocation puzzle requires
a saving wedge that is strongly negatively correlated with productivity growth. That is, the
1See Lucas (1990) for the seminal article and Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian (2007) on the upstream
ﬂows of capital.
1allocation puzzle is a saving puzzle.
The allocation puzzle is illustrated by Figure 1, which plots the average growth rate of
total factor productivity (TFP) against the average ratio of net capital inﬂows to GDP for
68 developing countries over the period 1980-2000.2 Although the variables are averaged
over two decades, there is substantial cross-country variation both in the direction and in
the volume of net capital inﬂows, with some countries receiving more than 10 percent of
their GDP in capital inﬂows on average (Mozambique, Tanzania, Rep. of Congo), whereas
others export about 7 percent of their GDP in capital outﬂows (Taiwan). More strikingly,
the correlation between the two variables is negative, the opposite of the theoretical pre-
diction.3 To illustrate with two countries that are typical of this relationship (i.e., close to
the regression line), Korea, a development success story with an average TFP growth of 4.1
percent per year and an average annual investment rate of 34 percent, received almost no
net capital inﬂows, whereas Madagascar, whose TFP fell by 1.5 percent a year and average
annual investment rate barely reached 3 percent, received 7 percent of its GDP in capital
inﬂows each year, on average. As we show in this paper, the pattern observed in Figure
1 is just one illustration of a range of results that point in the same direction: standard
models have a hard time accounting for the allocation of international capital ﬂows across
developing countries. Capital ﬂows from rich to poor countries are not only low (as argued
by Lucas (1990)), but their allocation across developing countries seems to be the opposite
of the predictions of the standard textbook model. This is the allocation puzzle.
What can, then, explain the puzzling allocation of capital ﬂows across developing coun-
tries? Although the main purpose of this paper is to establish and characterize the allocation
puzzle rather than solve it, we oﬀer some thoughts on possible explanations at the end of
the paper. Our wedge analysis shows that the explanation must involve the relationship
between savings and growth. We argue that the discrepancy between the predictions of
a standard model and the data might be explained by non-standard preferences, ﬁnancial
frictions or international trade. No attempt is made to discriminate empirically between
2Net capital inﬂows are measured as the ratio of a country’s current account deﬁcit over its GDP, averaged
over the period 1980-2000. The construction of the data is explained in more detail in section 3.
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Figure 1: Average productivity growth and average capital inﬂows between 1980 and 2000.
these explanations in this paper—the objective being merely to demonstrate the robustness
of our empirical ﬁnding and propose a road map to think about future research rather than
to establish new theoretical results.
This paper lies at the conﬂuence of diﬀerent lines of literature. First, it is related to
other papers on the determinants of capital inﬂows to developing countries, and on their role
in economic development. Aizenman, Pinto and Radziwill (2004) construct a self-ﬁnancing
ratio indicating what would have been the counterfactual stock of capital in the absence of
capital inﬂows. They ﬁnd that 90 percent of the stock of capital in developing countries is
self-ﬁnanced, and that countries with higher self-ﬁnancing ratios grew faster in the 1990s.
Prasad et al. (2007) also document a negative cross-country correlation between the ratio
of capital inﬂows to GDP and growth, and discuss possible explanations for this ﬁnding.4
Manzocchi and Martin (1997) empirically test an equation for capital inﬂows derived from
an open-economy growth model on cross-section data for 33 developing countries—and ﬁnd
relatively weak support.
4Like us, Prasad et al. (2007) ﬁnd this correlation to be robust. In particular, it remains statistically
signiﬁcant if one excludes the countries receiving a large amount of foreign aid (averaging more than 10
percent of their GDP).
3The paper is also related to the literature on savings, growth, and investment. That liter-
ature has established a positive correlation between savings and growth, a puzzling fact from
the point of view of the permanent income hypothesis since high-growth countries should
borrow abroad against future income to ﬁnance a higher level of consumption (Carroll and
Summers (1991), Carroll and Weil (1994)). Starting with Feldstein and Horioka (1980), the
literature has also established a strongly positive correlation between savings and investment,
which seems diﬃcult to reconcile with free capital mobility. The allocation puzzle presented
in this paper is related to both puzzles, but it is stronger. Our ﬁnding is that the diﬀerence
between savings and investment (capital outﬂows) is positively correlated with productivity
growth: not only should savings be positively correlated with productivity growth but also
the correlation must be stronger than that between investment and productivity growth.
This paper is also related to the literature on the relationship between growth and the
current account in developing countries. Emerging market business cycles exhibit counter
cyclical current accounts, i.e., the current account balance tends to decrease when growth
picks up (see Aguiar and Gopinath (2007)). We show in this paper that the cross-country
correlation between growth and the current account is the opposite. Because of the very
low frequency at which we look at the data, a more natural benchmark of comparison is the
literature on transitional growth dynamics pioneered by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992).
King and Rebelo (1993) also examine transition dynamics in a variety of neoclassical growth
models. Unlike these papers, we allow countries to catch-up or fall behind relative to the
world technology frontier and focus on the implications of the theory for international capital
ﬂows.
The methodology in our paper is similar to Chari, McGrattan and Kehoe (2007)’s “busi-
ness cycle accounting.” Those authors show that a large class of dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium models are observationally equivalent to a benchmark real business cycle model
with correlated “wedges” in their ﬁrst-order conditions. The main diﬀerence is that while
that paper looks at real business ﬂuctuations, we focus here on long-term growth. In a more
closely related contribution, Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1996) show that a neoclassical
growth model with investment distortions does fairly well in accounting for the observed
4distribution of income and the patterns of investment across countries.
Finally this paper belongs to a small set of contributions that look at the implications of
the recent “development accounting” literature for international economics. Development ac-
counting has implications for the behavior of capital ﬂows that have not been systematically
explored in the literature (by contrast with investment, whose relationship with productiv-
ity is well understood and documented). Two conclusions from this literature are especially
relevant for our analysis. First, a substantial share of the cross-country inequality in income
per capita comes from cross-country diﬀerences in TFP —see Hall and Jones (1999) and the
subsequent literature on development accounting reviewed in Caselli (2004). The economic
take-oﬀ of a poor country, therefore, results from a convergence of its TFP toward the level
of advanced economies. Second, developing countries are able to accumulate the level of
productive capital that is warranted by their level of TFP. Caselli and Feyrer (2007) show
that the return to capital, once properly measured in a development accounting framework,
is very similar in advanced and developing countries.5 If we accept these conclusions, then
an open economy version of the basic neoclassical growth model should be a reasonable the-
oretical benchmark to think about the behavior of capital ﬂows toward developing countries.
The present paper is the ﬁrst, to our knowledge, to quantify the level of capital ﬂows to
developing countries in a calibrated open economy growth model and compare it with the
data.6
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model that we use to predict
the volume and allocation of capital ﬂows to developing countries. Section 3 then calibrates
the model using Penn World Table (PWT) data on a large sample of developing countries,
and establishes the allocation puzzle. Section 4 introduces the wedges into the model, and
section 5 concludes by speculating on possible explanations for the allocation puzzle.
5Caselli and Feyrer (2007) do not look at the contribution of capital ﬂows in equalizing returns. One
implication of their results is that observed returns to capital are not a good predictor of capital ﬂows (since
those returns are equal across countries, plus or minus a measurement error). Here, we look instead at the
underlying determinant of capital ﬂows in a world of perfect capital mobility, i.e., cross-country diﬀerences
in productivity paths.
6In Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) we use a development accounting framework similar to that in this
paper to quantify the welfare gains from capital mobility, and ﬁnd them to be relatively small. We do not
compare the predictions of the model with the observed capital ﬂows to developing countries as we do here.
52 Capital Flows in the Neoclassical Growth Model
The neoclassical growth framework postulates that the dynamics of growth are driven by
an exogenous productivity path. In this section we derive the implications of this view for
capital ﬂows, i.e., we show how the capital ﬂows to developing countries are determined by
their productivity paths relative to the world technology frontier. For simplicity, we assume
that each developing country can be viewed as a small open economy taking the world
interest rate as given. Thus, the model features only one country and the rest of the world.
2.1 Assumptions
Consider a small open economy that can borrow and lend at an exogenously given world gross
real interest rate R∗. Time is discrete and there is no uncertainty. The economy produces a





1−α , 0 < α < 1, (1)
where Kt is the stock of domestic physical capital, Lt the labor supply, and At the level of
productivity. The labor supply is exogenous and equal to the population (Lt = Nt). Factor
markets are perfectly competitive so each factor is paid its marginal product.
We assume that the country can issue external debt or accumulate foreign bonds. Thus
capital ﬂows will take the form of debt ﬂows (this is without restriction of generality since
there is no uncertainty). The economy’s aggregate budget constraint can be written,
Ct + It + R
∗Dt = Yt + Dt+1, (2)
It = Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt,
where It is investment, δ is the depreciation rate, R∗ is the world gross interest rate, and
Dt is the country’s external debt. The capital Kt is owned by residents. The country pays
the riskless interest rate on its debt because there is no default risk. The volume of capital
inﬂows in period t, Dt+1 − Dt, is equal to domestic investment, It, minus domestic savings,
6Yt − (R∗ − 1)Dt − Ct, with both terms playing an important role in the analysis.7
For simplicity, we assume perfect ﬁnancial integration, i.e., the level of Dt is uncon-
strained. This assumption makes sense as a theoretical benchmark—we will discuss the
implications of relaxing it in section 2.2. It is also not an implausible assumption to make
in light of Caselli and Feyrer (2007)’s ﬁnding that the real returns to capital are equalized
across the world.
Denote by Rt the marginal product of capital, net of depreciation:
Rt = α(kt/At)
α−1 + 1 − δ, (3)
where kt denotes capital per capita (more generally, lower case variables are normalized by
population). The ﬁrst wedge that we introduce into the model distorts investment decisions:
we assume that investors receive only a fraction (1 − τk) of the gross return Rt. We call τk the
‘capital wedge’. Like in the “business cycle accounting” literature, this wedge is introduced
in order to allow us to characterize the discrepancy between the model predictions and the
data on investment rates. It can be interpreted as a tax on gross capital income, or as
the result of other distortions—credit market imperfections, expropriation risk, bureaucracy,
bribery, and corruption—that would also introduce a ‘wedge’ between social and private
returns.
Capital mobility implies that the private return on domestic capital and the world real
interest rate are equal:
(1 − τk)Rt = R
∗. (4)
Substituting this into the expression for the gross return on capital (3), we obtain that
7Obviously, there can be a discrepancy between savings and investment because of capital ﬂows. The
Fisherian separation of savings and investment is at the core of the economics of capital ﬂows in the neo-
classical growth model. By contrast, in a closed economy, faster productivity growth leads to additional
investment only if it successfully mobilizes national savings through higher interest rates. This is the main
reason our results are diﬀerent from Chen, Imrohoroglu and Imrohoroglu (2006) who study the Japanese
saving rate from the perspective of a closed economy.
7the capital stock per eﬃcient unit of labor ˜ k = kt/At is constant and equal to:




R∗/(1 − τk) + δ − 1
1/1−α
, (5)
(‘tilde-variables’ will denote per capita variables in eﬃciency units: ˜ x = X/AN). Equation
(5) makes clear that the capital wedge τk is the only source of variation in the steady state
capital stock per eﬃcient unit of labor across countries. A higher wedge, equivalent to a
higher implicit tax on capital, depresses domestic capital accumulation and lowers ˜ k∗.
The country has an exogenous, deterministic productivity path (At)t=0,..,+∞, which is







The world productivity frontier reﬂects the advancement of knowledge, which is not country
speciﬁc, and is assumed to grow at a constant rate g∗.
Domestic productivity could grow at a rate that is higher or lower than g∗ for a ﬁnite
period of time. In order to describe how domestic productivity evolves relative to the world
frontier, it is convenient to deﬁne the diﬀerence between domestic productivity and the




We assume that π = limt→∞ πt is well deﬁned. The limit π measures the country’s long-
run technological catch-up relative to the world frontier. If π = 0, the country’s long-
run productivity remains unchanged relative to the world frontier. If π > 0, the country
catches up relative to the frontier, and if π < 0, the country falls further behind. Domestic
productivity converges to a fraction (1+π)A0/A∗
0 of the world frontier, and the growth rate
of domestic productivity converges to g∗.8
8That countries have the same growth rate in the long run is a standard assumption, often justiﬁed by
the fact that no country should have a share of world GDP converging to 0 or 100 percent. Models of idea
ﬂows such as Parente and Prescott (2000) or Eaton and Kortum (1999) imply a common long-run growth
rate of productivity.
8Next, we need to make some assumptions about the determination of domestic consump-
tion and savings. Here, we adopt the textbook Cass-Ramsey model extended to accommo-
date a growing population. The population Nt grows at an exogenous rate n: Nt = ntN0.
Like in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) we assume that the population can be viewed as a





s Nt+s u(ct+s), (6)
where u(c) ≡ (c1−γ − 1)/(1 − γ) is a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function
with coeﬃcient γ > 0. The number of families is normalized to 1, so that per family and
aggregate variables are the same.
We introduce our second wedge into the budget constraint of the representative family:
Ct + Kt+1 = (1 − τs)R
∗(Kt − Dt) + Dt+1 + Nt(wt + zt), (7)
where wt is the wage, equal to the marginal product of labor (1 − α)kα
t A
1−α
t , zt is a lump-
sum transfer and τs is the “saving wedge.” When positive, this wedge functions like a tax on
capital income. In order to focus solely on the distortion induced by the wedges, we assume
that the revenue per capita that they generate, zt = τkRtkt + τsR∗(kt − dt), is rebated to
households in a lump-sum fashion.
The representative resident maximizes the welfare function (6) under the budget con-











Equation (9) holds if the rest of the world is composed of advanced economies that have
the same preferences as the small economy under consideration, no saving wedge and have
9already achieved their steady state. This is a natural assumption to make, given that we
look at the impact on capital ﬂows of cross-country diﬀerences in productivity, rather than
preferences. We will also assume that τs = 0 in the long run, ensuring that the small open
economy ends up with the same consumption growth rate as the rest of the world.
A country is characterized by an initial capital stock per capita k0, debt per capita d0,
population growth rate n, productivity path {At}
∞
0 , and capital and saving wedges, τk and
τs. We assume that all countries are ﬁnancially open at time t = 0 and use the model to
estimate the size and the direction of capital ﬂows from t = 0 onward.
2.2 Productivity and capital ﬂows
We compare the predictions of the model with the data observed over a ﬁnite period of
time denoted [0,T]. We abstract from unobserved future developments in productivity by
assuming that all countries have the same productivity growth rate, g∗, after time T, and
that the saving wedge is zero after time T.
Assumption 1 πt = π and τs = 0 for t ≥ T.
For simplicity we further assume that the path for the ratio πt/π is the same for all
countries and satisﬁes πt ≤ π.
Assumption 2 πt = πf(t) where f(·) is common across countries and satisﬁes f(t) ≤ 1
and f(t) = 1 for t ≥ T.
This assumption allows us to characterize the productivity diﬀerences between countries
by one single parameter, the long-run productivity catch-up π.
Next, we need to deﬁne an appropriate measure of capital inﬂows during the time interval
[0,T]. A natural measure, in our model, is the change in external debt between 0 and T







The normalization by initial GDP ensures that the measure is comparable across countries
of diﬀerent sizes.9
9We also looked at other possible measures of capital inﬂows and found our main conclusions to be robust.
For example, capital inﬂows could be measured as the average ratio of net capital inﬂows to GDP (like in
10The following proposition characterizes how the direction and volume of capital ﬂows
depend on the exogenous parameters of the model.





e k0, e d0,π,τk,τs

. (11)
Under general conditions, this function is increasing in the initial level of debt (e d0), the
productivity catch-up parameter (π) and the saving wedge (τs), and decreasing in the initial
level of capital (e k0) and the capital wedge (τk).
Proof. See appendix A
A closed-form expression for ∆D/Y0 is derived in appendix A. Here, we provide intuition
for proposition 1 by looking at the case without saving wedge (τs = 0). Then, cumulated
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where e w is the normalized real wage and ˜ zk is the normalized lump-sum transfer ﬁnanced by
the capital wedge. Equation (12) implies that a country without capital scarcity (˜ k0 = ˜ k∗),
without initial debt (˜ d0 = 0) and without productivity catch-up (π = 0) has zero capital
ﬂows. Consider now each term on the right-hand side of equation (12) in turn.
The ﬁrst term, ∆Dc/Y0, results from the initial level of capital scarcity ˜ k∗ − ˜ k0. Under
ﬁnancial integration, and in the absence of ﬁnancial frictions or adjustment cost of capital,
the country instantly borrows and invests precisely the amount ˜ k∗ − ˜ k0. We call this term
the convergence term.
The second term, ∆Dt/Y0, reﬂects the impact of initial debt in the presence of trend
growth (ng∗ > 1). In the absence of productivity catch-up the economy follows a balanced
Figure 1) or as the change in the ratio of net foreign liabilities to GDP. In Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007)
we show that the predictions of the model are qualitatively the same for the three measures of capital ﬂows.
Moreover, we show that if the allocation puzzle is observed with measure (10) then it must also hold with
the two other measures. This is another reason to use measure (10) as a benchmark when we look at the
data.
11growth path in which external debt remains a constant fraction of output. The cumulated
debt inﬂows that are required to keep the debt-to-output ratio constant are equal to ∆Dt.
The third and fourth terms in (12) reﬂect the impact of the productivity catch-up. The
third term, ∆Di/Y0, represents the external borrowing that goes toward ﬁnancing domestic
investment. To see this, observe that since capital per eﬃcient unit of labor remains constant
at ˜ k∗, capital per capita needs to increase more when there is a productivity catch-up. With-
out productivity catch-up, capital at time T would be ˜ k∗NTA0g∗T. Instead, it is ˜ k∗NTAT.
The diﬀerence, π˜ k∗NTA0g∗T, normalized by output ˜ y0A0N0, is equal to ∆Di/Y0.
Finally, the fourth term, ∆Ds/Y0, represents the change in external debt brought about
by changes in domestic saving. It is proportional to normalized after-transfer labor income
˜ w + ˜ z and to the long-run productivity catch-up π. Faster relative productivity growth
implies higher future income, leading to an increase in consumption and a decrease in savings.
Since current income is unchanged, the representative domestic consumer borrows on the
international markets.
As shown in Appendix A, introducing saving wedges slightly complicates expression (12),
but the impact of the wedges on capital inﬂows is intuitive. The investment wedge reduces
the predicted level of capital inﬂows by lowering initial capital scarcity as well as the impact
of productivity catch-up on investment. By contrast, the saving wedge lowers domestic
savings between time 0 and time T and so increases the predicted level of capital inﬂows.
It is then easy to show the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Capital ﬂows and productivity catch-up.
1. Consider a country without initial capital scarcity, initial debt, or saving wedge. Then
the country receives a positive level of capital inﬂows if and only if its productivity
catches up relative to the world technology frontier:
∆D > 0 if and only if π > 0.
2. Consider two countries A and B, identical except for their long-run productivity catch-
up. Then country A receives more capital inﬂows than country B if and only if A
12catches up more than B toward the world technology frontier:
∆D
A > ∆D
B if and only if π
A > π
B.
The ﬁrst part of the corollary says that capital should ﬂow into the developing countries
whose TFP catches up relative to the world frontier, and should ﬂow out of the countries
whose TFP falls behind. This is not a surprising result: international capital markets should
allocate capital to the countries where it becomes more productive relative to the rest of the
world. The second part of the corollary says that other things equal, the countries that grow
faster should receive more capital ﬂows.
Our results rely on a set of simple assumptions (perfect capital mobility, perfect foresight,
inﬁnitely-lived agents). However, the comparative static results stated in Proposition 1—and
in particular, the positive correlation between productivity catch-up and capital inﬂows—
hold in a much larger set of models. First, consider the assumption of perfect capital mobility.
In reality, ﬁnancial frictions may limit severely—perhaps eliminate altogether—the ability of
developing countries to borrow in order to smooth consumption proﬁles. Yet, we would argue
that, while international ﬁnancial frictions may be important, they are unlikely to reverse
the direction of capital ﬂows, or the sign of their correlation with productivity growth.
To see this, suppose that external debt cannot exceed a certain ceiling that is increasing
with domestic output and domestic capital. This type of constraint arises in models in
which the country can pledge only up to a fraction of domestic capital or output to foreign
creditors. If the constraint is binding, countries with higher productivity growth have higher
output and capital, and so can borrow more from abroad as their collateral constraint is
relaxed. It also remains true that a country without initial debt or capital scarcity receives
a positive level of capital inﬂows if and only if it catches up relative to the world frontier.10
Hence, Corollary 1 remains true. International ﬁnancial frictions can reduce the predicted
size of capital inﬂows, but does not change the correlation between π and ∆D.
10Such a country accumulates foreign assets if π < 0. If π > 0, the country wants to borrow and the only
impact of the debt ceiling is to constrain the volume of borrowing.
13Second, there are several reasons to take the savings component ∆Ds/Y0 less seriously
than the other components when looking at the quantitative predictions of the model. The
implications of the textbook neoclassical growth model for savings are not especially robust.
For example, the behavior of aggregate saving would be diﬀerent if the economy were pop-
ulated by overlapping generations instead of inﬁnitely-lived consumers. Furthermore, the
predictions of the textbook model for savings have already been found to be at odds with
the data in the literature. As we have mentioned in the introduction, other models have
been developed to explain the positive association between growth and national saving that
is observed in the data.
Thus, one might want to look at the implications of the model when the savings compo-
nent ∆Ds/Y0 is omitted. In fact, omitting this component is exactly what one should do if
the perfect foresight assumption were relaxed in a plausible way. So far we have assumed
that the path of future productivity is known with certainty as of time t = 0. Instead, let
us assume that agents expect future productivity growth to remain constant and equal to
g∗. This is a reasonable approximation, in light of Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett and Summers
(1993) ﬁnding that output growth rates are unpredictable, and uncorrelated across decades.
Ex-ante, households might be unsure about how long a period of high or low growth will last.
In order to abstract from the complications associated with precautionary savings, we solve
the model under certainty equivalence and assume that agents always expect productivity
to grow at rate g∗ with certainty. Under this assumption we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2 If agents always expect productivity to grow at rate g∗ and there is no saving
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Proof. See appendix A.
The only diﬀerence between equations (13) and (12) is that the consumption smooth-
ing term, ∆Ds/Y , has disappeared. The intuition is straightforward: when productivity is
expected to grow at rate g∗, the consumption-savings choices are the same as in the bal-
14anced growth path with no productivity catch-up. Productivity inﬂuences capital ﬂows only
through the investment term.
However, whether or not we take the savings component ∆Ds/Y0 into account does not
change the model’s prediction about the sign of the correlation between productivity growth
and capital inﬂows. Countries that grow at a higher rate should receive more capital inﬂows.
We now proceed to look at this correlation in the data.
3 The Allocation Puzzle
Are the model’s predictions concerning capital ﬂows supported by the empirical evidence?
To be more speciﬁc, do developing countries with faster productivity growth and larger initial
capital scarcity receive more capital ﬂows? We answer this question by estimating, for each
country, their initial capital scarcity and productivity growth, then comparing the actual
and predicted net capital ﬂows.
3.1 Measuring productivity growth and capital ﬂows
We focus on the period 1980-2000. This choice of period is motivated by two considerations.
First, the sample period cannot start too early because countries need to be ﬁnancially
open over most of the period under study. Indicators of ﬁnancial openness indicate a sharp
increase starting in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For instance, the Chinn and Ito (2007)
index indicates an average increase in ﬁnancial openness from 31.3 in 1980 to 42.5 in 2000
for the countries in our sample.11 Second, we want as long a sample as possible, since the
focus is on long-term capital ﬂows. Results over shorter periods may be disproportionately
aﬀected by a ﬁnancial crisis in some countries or by ﬂuctuations in the world business cycle.
Our ﬁnal sample consists of 68 developing countries: 65 non-OECD countries, as well as
Korea, Mexico and Turkey.12
11The index is normalized to run from 0 (most closed) to 100 (most open).
12We will sometimes refer to the countries in our sample simply as non-OECD countries. For a small set
of countries, the sample period starts later and/or end earlier, due to data availability. The list of countries
and sample period are reported in appendix C.
15We measure productivity growth following the method that has become standard in
the development accounting literature. First we estimate n for each country as the annual
growth rate of the working-age population.13 The other country-speciﬁc data are the paths
for output, capital and productivity. Those data come from Version 6.1 of the Penn World
Tables (Heston, Summers and Aten (2004)). The capital stock Kt is constructed with the
perpetual inventory method from time series data on real investment (also from the PWT),
assuming a capital share α of 0.3 and a depreciation rate δ of 6 percent.14 From equation
(1), we obtain the level of productivity At as (yt/kα
t )
1/(1−α), and the level of capital stock
per eﬃcient unit of labor ˜ kt as (kt/yt)
1/(1−α). The growth rate of world productivity g∗ is set
to 1.017, the annual TFP growth observed on average in the U.S. between 1980 and 2000.
The productivity catch-up parameter, π, is then measured as ¯ A2000/(g∗20 ¯ A1980) − 1, where
¯ At is obtained as the trend component of the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter of At. This detrending
removes short term ﬂuctuations in productivity due to mismeasurement or business cycle
factors.
We then construct, for each country, the volume of capital inﬂows between 1980 and 2000







We measure net capital inﬂows in current U.S. dollars using IMF’s International Financial
Statistics data on current account deﬁcits, keeping with the usual practice that considers
errors and omissions as unreported capital ﬂows. We need an appropriate price index to
convert this measure into constant international dollars, the unit used in the Penn World
Tables for real variables such as output and capital stocks. In principle, the trade and current
account balances should be deﬂated by the price of traded goods, but the Penn World Tables
do not report this price index. We used instead the price of investment goods reported in
the Penn World Tables. This seems to be a good proxy because investment goods are mostly
13Working-age population (typically ages 15-64) is constructed using United Nations data on World Pop-
ulation Prospects.
14See Caselli (2004) for details. Following standard practice, we set initial capital to I/(gi + δ) where I
is the initial investment level from the PWT and gi is the rate of growth of real investment for the ﬁrst 10
years of available data. Recent estimates by Gollin (2002) suggest that the capital share is roughly constant
within countries, and varies between 0.2 and 0.4 across countries.
16tradable—as suggested by the fact that their price vary less across countries than that of
consumption goods. The PPP adjustment will tend to reduce the estimated size of capital
ﬂows relative to output in poor countries, because those countries have a lower price of
output (see Hsieh and Klenow (2007)). Appendix B provides additional details.
One advantage of our PPP-adjusted estimates of cumulated capital ﬂows is that they
can be compared to the measures of output or capital accumulation used in the development
accounting literature. The allocation puzzle, however, does not hinge on the particular
assumptions that we make in constructing those estimates. We tried other deﬂators, which
did not aﬀect the thrust of our results.15
3.2 Correlation between productivity growth and capital ﬂows
Table 1 presents estimates for the productivity catch-up parameters and capital ﬂows for the
whole sample as well as regional and income groups. The estimates of π reported in column
1 show that there is no overall productivity catch-up with advanced countries: π is negative
on average. Thus we should not expect a lot of capital to ﬂow from advanced to developing
countries. Yet, closer inspection reveals an interesting geographical pattern. There was a
sizeable productivity catch-up in Asia, while Latin America and Africa fell behind.16 So we
should expect international capital to ﬂow out of Africa and Latin America, and into Asia.
This does not seem to be the case in the data. Column 2 of Table 1 reports observed
net capital inﬂows, as a fraction of initial output, ∆D/Y0. Africa received about 40 percent
of its initial output in capital ﬂows. Similarly, capital ﬂows to Latin America amounted to
37 percent of its initial output, in spite of a signiﬁcant relative productivity decline. By
contrast, Asia, whose productivity grew at the highest rate, borrowed over that period only
11 percent of its initial output.
The same pattern is evident if we group countries by income levels rather than regions.
According to Table 1, poorer countries experienced lower productivity catch-up and so should
15For instance, results are similar when using the price of output as a deﬂator. The results available from
the authors upon request.
16This pattern does not apply uniformly to all countries within a region. For instance, we ﬁnd π = −0.34
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export more capital. Observed capital inﬂows run in the exact opposite direction: actual
capital ﬂows decrease with income per capita, from 56 percent of output for low income
countries to -58 percent for high-income non-OECD countries.
Figure 2 gives a broader cross-country perspective on the correlation between produc-
tivity catch-up and capital inﬂows by plotting those variables for the full country sample.
One observes immediately that most countries are located in the ‘wrong’ quadrant of the ﬁg-
ure, with negative productivity catch-up but positive capital inﬂows. Indeed, the empirical
correlation between productivity catch-up and capital inﬂows is negative and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.17 Figure 2 conﬁrms, with diﬀerent measures, the basic
correlation already shown in Figure 1.
To summarize, we ﬁnd strong evidence against the predictions of the model regarding
productivity: countries with faster productivity growth attract less capital inﬂows. This is
the allocation puzzle.
17The slope of the regression line in ﬁgure 2 is -0.68 with a s.e. of 0.18 (p-value smaller than 0.01).
183.3 Robustness
We ran a number of straightforward robustness checks. First, we checked that our results
were robust to the exclusion of African countries (where arguably many countries may be
too poor to export capital while maintaining subsistence levels of consumption). Second, we
started the analysis in 1970 instead of 1980. The sample is much smaller (30 countries), but
the results are broadly similar. Third, we split the sample according to whether Chinn and
Ito’s (2007) index of ﬁnancial account openness is above or below the sample median. One
would a priori expect a better ﬁt between the model and the data for more ﬁnancially open
countries. Yet the results are similar for both groups of countries.18
We also looked at the potential bias induced by aid ﬂows. The basic neoclassical frame-
work may not be appropriate to predict oﬃcial aid ﬂows because aid is not necessarily
allocated to countries with the highest expected returns on capital.19 This objection does
not invalidate, per se, the predictions of the basic model for net capital ﬂows. If we modeled
aid as a lump-sum transfer to the representative agent in the model of section 2, then aid
would immediately leave the country—as the representative agent would ﬁnd it optimal to
invest it abroad—and the predictions of the model would remain valid for net capital ﬂows.
Indeed, one may think of cases where external borrowing or oﬃcial aid go hand-in-hand
with the commensurate overseas enrichment of a few government oﬃcials.20 Our benchmark
approach is robust to these unrecorded ﬁnancial transactions, since we measure net capital
inﬂows using data on current account deﬁcits, and treat errors and omissions as unrecorded
capital ﬂows.
However, things might be diﬀerent if private capital ﬂows are constrained by ﬁnancial
frictions that do not aﬀect public ﬂows to the same extent. Then, aid could ﬁnance an
18Those results are available upon request.
19On the one hand, if aid has any eﬀectiveness the ﬂows of development aid should be positively correlated
with productivity growth. On the other hand, there is a selection bias if the countries that have been receiving
aid ﬂows over long periods of time are those that have failed to develop. In addition, the components of aid
that are justiﬁed by humanitarian reasons should be negatively correlated with growth. The large literature
on development aid has generally failed to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between aid and growth (see Rajan
and Subramanian (2005)).
20For a recent discussion of a number of well-known cases and an analysis along these lines, see Jayachan-
dran and Kremer (2006).
19increase in domestic expenditures above and beyond what could be ﬁnanced by private
capital ﬂows. In addition, capital controls could prevent aid inﬂows from being completely
oﬀset by a capital outﬂow. In those cases, aid would not be neutral and its impact on our
results should be examined.
To see how far aid ﬂows can go in explaining the puzzles, we make the extreme assump-
tion that those ﬂows are not oﬀset by any other type of capital ﬂows. This is an extreme
assumption since, as argued above, part of the oﬃcial aid ﬂows could easily ﬁnd their way
back outside of the country. Our measure of oﬃcial aid ﬂows is the net overseas devel-
opment assistance (net ODA) from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC).21 As
shown in Appendix B, it is possible to compute the PPP-adjusted cumulated net ODA ﬂows
normalized by initial GDP using the same method as for net capital ﬂows.
Our assumption that oﬃcial aid ﬂows have no oﬀset means that in the absence of aid
ﬂows the counterfactual volume of net capital ﬂows would have been equal to the observed







Column 3 of Table 1 reports the results for the aid-adjusted capital ﬂows. Since net
ODA ﬂows are always positive in our sample (all developing countries are net recipients),
∆D0 is always smaller than ∆D. As a result, the average developing country is found to
export capital net of aid ﬂows (20 percent of initial output, on average). This comes mostly
from the low-income and African countries for whom gross aid inﬂows are twice as large as
total net inﬂows. However, the allocation puzzle persists since higher income countries and
Asian countries export relatively more capital than low income countries or Latin American
countries, in contradiction with the predictions of the model.
The correlation between productivity catch-up and aid-adjusted capital ﬂows is shown in
Figure 3. A large level of cross-country variation in capital ﬂows remains. The correlation
21This measure is available for all countries in our sample, except Taiwan. According to Roodman (2006),
DAC counts total grants and concessionnal development loans and subtracts principle repayments on these
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vertical bars report the initial (top) and aid-adjusted (bottom) change in external debt for
each country.
remains negative, although it is no longer signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.22
We conclude that although oﬃcial aid ﬂows contribute to the allocation puzzle, they
do not explain it. The cross-country variation in capital inﬂows appears to be (at best)
orthogonal to its main theoretical determinant—productivity growth. Even after adjusting
for aid, the only region whose productivity caught up relative to the world frontier (Asia)
has been exporting capital while theory predicts substantial capital inﬂows.
4 Wedges
Capital inﬂows are the diﬀerence between investment and savings. In this section we estimate
the capital and saving wedges that allow the model to match the observed levels of investment
and savings for each country in our sample. There is separability between the two wedges,
in the sense that the capital wedge required to explain the observed investment rate can
22The slope of a regression of aid-adjusted capital ﬂows on productivity catch-up is -0.07 with a s.e. equal
to 0.23 (p-value 0.76).
21be computed independently of the saving wedge required to explain the observed level of
savings. We start with the capital wedge.
4.1 The capital wedge
Our approach is to calibrate the capital wedge so as to match exactly investment rates in
the data. We assume for simplicity that the productivity catch-up follows a linear path:
f (t) = min(t/T,1). The world interest rate is set to R∗ − 1 = 5.94 percent per year, which
results from the assumptions made about individual preferences in the following section.
The capital wedge τk can be estimated to match the observed investment rates, as shown in
the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Given an initial capital stock ˜ k0, productivity catch-up π, and capital wedge
τk, the average investment-output ratio between t = 0 and t = T −1 can be decomposed into













∗n + ˜ k
∗ (τk)
1−α (g
∗n + δ − 1). (14)
Proof. See appendix A.
Equation (14) has a simple interpretation. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side corre-
sponds to the investment at time t = 0 that is required to put capital at its equilibrium
level. This is the convergence component. The second term reﬂects the additional invest-
ment required by the productivity catch-up. The last term is simply the usual formula for
the investment rate in steady state, with productivity growth g∗. It corresponds to the
investment required to oﬀset capital depreciation, adjusted for productivity and population
growth.23
Solving (14) numerically, we obtain the capital wedge τk as a function of the observed
average investment rate ik, productivity catch-up π and population growth n. Appendix
C reports the values of ik, π, n and τk for each country in our sample. Everything else
equal, our calibration approach assigns a high capital wedge to countries with low average
investment rate.
23Observe that when g∗ = n = 1, this last term simpliﬁes to δ˜ k∗(1−α) = δ˜ k∗/˜ y∗.
22Our estimates of the capital wedge assume that countries are perfectly integrated. Al-
though international ﬁnancial frictions could bias our estimates of τk, this bias should not
aﬀect the model’s predictions for the direction of capital ﬂows. In the case of a capital-scarce
country where ﬁnancial frictions maintain the domestic interest rate above the world level,
the observed investment rate will be lower than under perfect ﬁnancial integration, leading
us to overestimate the capital wedge τk and thus underestimate the level of capital inﬂows
needed to equalize returns. Symmetrically, in the case of a capital abundant country the
bias induced by ﬁnancial frictions should lead us to underestimate capital outﬂows. The
important point is that while there is a downward bias in the predicted size of capital ﬂows,
the model still predicts accurately their direction and relative magnitude.
With these caveats in mind, Table 2 reports information on the investment rate, the
capital wedge, and the decomposition of the observed investment rate ik into the three
components of equation (14). First, as is well known, investment rates vary widely across
regions. They also vary with income levels, increasing from 8.5 percent for low income
countries to 28.5 percent for high-income non-OECD countries. Table 2 indicates that most
of the variation in the investment rate is accounted for by the trend component, which itself
is strongly correlated with the capital wedge τk (reported in column 5). To a ﬁrst order
of approximation, countries with a high investment rate are those that maintain a high
capital-to-output ratio because of a low distortion on capital accumulation.
The convergence and productivity growth components (columns 2 and 3) account for
a relatively small share of the investment rates on average. The small contribution of the
convergence component is explained by the fact that the initial capital gap was relatively
small on average at the beginning of the sample period (k0/k∗ = 0.98). But this average
masks signiﬁcant regional disparities between Asia and Latin America, which were capital
scarce (k0/k∗ = 0.87 and 0.94 respectively), and Africa, which was capital abundant (k0/k∗ =
1.09). Because the countries that were capital-scarce in 1980 also tended to have a higher
productivity growth rate in the following two decades, the cumulated contribution of the
productivity and convergence components can be signiﬁcant. This is most apparent if one



























































































−.75 −.5 −.25 0 .25 .5 .75 1
Productivity Catch−Up
Figure 4: Productivity catch-up (π) and capital wedge (τk).
half of the diﬀerence in the investment rate between the two regions.
We observe that the estimated capital wedge (column 5) has a plausible order of mag-
nitude. It varies between 51.4 percent for Uganda and -2.5 percent for Singapore, with an
average of 11.5 percent. It is negatively correlated with both the level of economic devel-
opment and the productivity catch-up parameter (see Figure 4)—consistent with the idea
that economic development is associated with better institutions and lower distortions. The
negative correlation between the capital wedge and the productivity catch-up magniﬁes the
positive correlation between the productivity catch-up and capital inﬂows predicted by the
model —which tends, if anything, to aggravate the allocation puzzle.
That the capital wedge does not help to explain the allocation puzzle is made clear by
Figure 5. This ﬁgure plots the volume of capital inﬂows predicted by the model with capital
wedges against the productivity catch-up π. The correlation is positive and statistically
very signiﬁcant: according to the model countries with productivity catch-up should be net
recipients of foreign capital; countries falling behind should be net lenders.24
24We estimate a slope coeﬃcient of 19.06, with a s.e. of 0.74 (p-value<0.01). Excluding the consumption
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predicted by the model with
capital wedges.
As a ﬁnal comment, it is interesting to note that the capital wedge plays the same role
as adjusting for non-reproducible capital and relative price eﬀects discussed in Caselli and
Feyrer (2007). Those authors argue that, while naive estimates of the marginal product
of capital vary enormously across countries, the returns to capital are essentially the same
once the estimates are adjusted for cross-country diﬀerences in the share of non-reproducible
capital in total capital and in the price of reproducible capital in terms of output, which
are both higher in less advanced countries. Our approach leads to the same cross-country
compression in the estimates of the returns on capital, but it is achieved by the capital wedge
τk.
To illustrate, Figure 6 compares the naive estimate of private returns (left panel), deﬁned
as RN = αY/K−δ, and the wedge-adjusted return (right panel), RW = (1 − τk)(1 + RN)−
1, against 2000 income per capita. The left-hand side top panel indicates enormous variation
in the naive estimate, between 3.6 percent (Singapore) and 110 percent (Haiti), with a
mean of 22.3 percent. By contrast, the wedge-adjusted return varies between -2.5 percent
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Figure 6: Na¨ ıve and Wedge-adjusted Marginal Product of Capital in year 2000.
compression is remarkable, given that the capital wedge is not calibrated to ensure private
returns equalization. Our results thus parallel those of Caselli and Feyrer (2007): private
returns to capital appear remarkably similar across countries.25
To summarize, introducing investment wedges to match observed investment rates into
the model does not help to solve the allocation puzzle, but is consistent with the equalization
of private returns to capital across countries. We now turn to the saving wedges.
4.2 The saving wedge
We now estimate the saving wedges that are required to explain the level of capital ﬂows
observed in the data. Having estimated the capital wedge using observed investment rate,
we now compute for each country the saving wedge τs such that the model-predicted level
of net capital inﬂows is equal to the observed level,
D
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With those capital wedges the model perfectly replicates observed capital ﬂows. In order to
compute the left-hand side of the equation above, we need to make further assumptions about
preferences. We assume logarithmic preferences (γ = 1) and set the discount factor β to
0.96. The coeﬃcient or relative risk aversion γ matters for the size of the estimated saving
wedge but not for its correlation with the productivity catch-up. Given these parameter
25In Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) we also look at the correlation between productivity growth and capital
inﬂows when productivity is measured based on the model with non-reproducible capital of Caselli and Feyrer
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Figure 7: Productivity catch-up (π) and saving wedges (τs).
values, the world real interest rate is equal to R∗ − 1 = 5.94 percent per year.
Figure 7 reports the calibrated saving wedge against the productivity catch-up π. A
number of salient facts stand out. First, we observe that the saving wedge needed to account
for aggregate saving ranges from -6 percent for countries such as Taiwan or Singapore, to
6 percent for countries such as Rwanda or Angola, with an average of 1 percent. Second,
the pattern of saving wedges across countries is far from random. We observe a strong
negative correlation between the saving wedge and productivity catch-up: countries whose
productivity catches up (π > 0) are also countries that “subsidize”saving (τs < 0) while
countries that fall behind (π < 0) are countries that “tax” saving (τs > 0). The linearity
and intercept (close to 0) of this relationship imply that on average, countries that catch-
up twice as much in terms of productivity “subsidize” their saving twice as much. Given
the sensitivity of capital ﬂows to the saving wedge, this translates into signiﬁcant capital
outﬂows.
Explaining the allocation puzzle requires explaining the correlation shown in Figure 7.
To some extent, the saving wedge can be interpreted as a distortion. This is for example the
case if a negative wedge (a saving subsidy) reﬂects domestic ﬁnancial repression that prevents
27residents from borrowing against their future income.26 The gaps between the model and
the data may also reﬂect the fact that the model is failing along some important and missing
dimension of the real world. We discuss possible extension of the model in the next section.
We conclude this section by showing the decomposition of the observed levels of capital
ﬂows into the same four terms as in equation (12).27 The wedges are now included, so that
the model predicts exactly the observed capital ﬂows for each country. Table 3 presents the
decomposition together with the calibrated saving wedge τs.
We observe ﬁrst that the convergence (column 2) and investment (column 3) components
are independent from the saving wedge τs. They reﬂect simply initial capital scarcity, pro-
ductivity catch-up and distortions in the accumulation of domestic capital summarized by
the capital wedge τk. Not surprisingly, the convergence component is positive for Asia and
Latin America (capital scarce regions) and negative for Africa (capital abundant), while the
investment component is positive for Asia (productivity catch-up) and negative for Latin
America and Africa (productivity decline). The sum of these two terms is negatively corre-
lated with observed capital inﬂows. This illustrates the extent to which the allocation puzzle
is a saving puzzle: adjusting investment rates to account for physical capital accumulation
is not enough to account for patterns of capital ﬂows across countries. The saving wedge is
essential to account for the observed pattern of net capital ﬂows across developing countries.
This saving wedge aﬀects the remaining two components, the saving component and the
trend component.28 Our wedge analysis indicates that Asia subsidizes saving (τs = −1.14
percent) while Latin America and Africa tax savings similarly (τs = 1.8 percent). Similarly,
the saving tax decreases with levels of development.
26But note that the distortion would need to be positively correlated with productivity growth to account
for ﬁgure 7.
27See equation (24) in appendix A.
28The latter since a positive saving wedge makes households more impatient, so that they will run down
initial wealth k0 − d0 at a faster rate, resulting in larger capital inﬂows.
285 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper establishes a puzzling stylized fact: capital tends to ﬂow more toward countries
with lower productivity growth and lower investment. This is puzzling for neoclassical models
of growth—in fact, this makes one wonder if the textbook neoclassical framework is the
right model at all to think about the link between international ﬁnancial integration and
development.
We have also shown that the allocation puzzle can be “resolved” by introducing into the
model a saving wedge, if this saving wedge is suﬃciently negatively correlated with produc-
tivity growth. This result tells us that explaining the allocation puzzle means understanding
the correlation between saving and growth in developing countries. The next question, of
course, is what type of discrepancy between the undistorted neoclassical growth model and
the real world is captured by our saving wedge. We conclude with a discussion of some
possible approaches to answering this question. This discussion is meant as a tentative road
map for future research, not as an attempt to push forward a particular explanation.29
A ﬁrst class of explanations considers the causality from savings to growth. Note that
the relevant growth rate here is the growth rate of productivity, not of output per capita, so
the mechanism must involve some endogeneity of domestic productivity to domestic savings.
This is the case in many closed-economy models of endogenous growth, but this feature does
not easily survive perfect capital mobility, which makes domestic savings a small component
of the global savings pool. For domestic savings to increase growth in the open economy,
there must be a friction that prevents domestic savings and foreign savings from being perfect
substitutes. Aghion, Comin and Howitt (2006) present an example of a model with those
features.30
Another class of explanations considers the causality from growth to savings.31 In
29Indeed, the explanations reviewed below are not mutually exclusive, and may be complementary. More-
over, the most relevant explanation may not be the same for diﬀerent countries or regions.
30In their model domestic savings matters for innovation because it fosters the involvement of domestic
intermediaries with a superior monitoring technology. However, the model does not include investment in
productive physical capital.
31Carroll, Overland and Weil (2000) present evidence suggesting that the causality runs from growth to
savings.
29Modigliani’s (1970) life cycle model faster growth raises aggregate savings by increasing
the saving of younger richer cohorts relative to the dissaving of older poorer cohorts. Other
authors have pointed to a number of problems with the life-cycle model and put forward
an alternative theory based on consumption habit (Carroll and Weil (1994), Carroll et al.
(2000)). In the habit model, faster growth increases savings as households adjust their
consumption levels only slowly. Whether models with consumption habit can explain the
allocation puzzle is an open question for future research. It requires that consumption levels
increase suﬃciently slowly for saving to increase faster than investment.
Another approach emphasizes the distortions in the relationship between growth and
savings induced by domestic frictions, in particular in the ﬁnancial sector. International
ﬁnancial frictions that increase the cost of external ﬁnance relative to domestic ﬁnance
cannot explain the puzzle since, as mentioned earlier, they can mute the absolute size of
capital ﬂows, not change their direction. By contrast, domestic ﬁnancial frictions might
be able to do so, because of the impact they have on the relationship between savings,
investment and growth. As shown by Gertler and Rogoﬀ (1990) and Matsuyama (2004),
domestic ﬁnancial frictions can reverse the direction of capital ﬂows between rich and poor
countries. Can they have the same eﬀect between high-growth and low-growth countries?
Low domestic ﬁnancial development may constrain domestic demand—and increase do-
mestic savings—in several ways. First, it constrains the residents’ ability to borrow against
future income or store value in sound ﬁnancial instruments. Further, an ineﬃcient ﬁnancial
intermediation system could also reduce the responsiveness of investment to productivity
growth. Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008) present a model in which ﬁnancially un-
derdeveloped countries run larger current account surpluses if they grow faster for these
reasons.
Low domestic ﬁnancial development and lack of social insurance may also constrain the
ability of residents to insure eﬃciently and encourages precautionary savings.32 It has often
been argued that some Asian emerging market countries have accumulated reserves to deal
with the aggregate risk of crisis, or the rise in idiosyncratic risk that is associated with the
32See Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2007).
30transition to a market economy (see Chamon and Prasad (2008) for China). Carroll and
Jeanne (2008) and Sandri (2008) present dynamic optimization models in which a positive
correlation between growth and idiosyncratic risk can reverse the sign of the relationship be-
tween growth and capital ﬂows if the country does not develop public or private mechanisms
of insurance covering those risks.
The last channel to consider is trade. Another way of presenting the allocation puzzle
is that net exports are positively correlated with productivity growth across countries—
consistent with a view in development economics that emphasizes the importance of exports
in economic development (see Rodrik (2006) for a recent exposition). If productivity take-
oﬀs originate in the tradable sector before spilling over to the nontradable sector, the initial
phase of the economic take-oﬀ could be associated with a surge in net exports, and capital
outﬂows.
To conclude, the main explanation for the allocation puzzle is an open question. Our
wedge analysis has shown that the relationship between growth and savings is key. We
have discussed several channels that could help understand the discrepancy between the
predictions of the basic neoclassical model of growth and the data on capital ﬂows. It seems
important to know more about those channels if one wants to understand how international
ﬁnancial integration helps economic development.
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A.1 Proof of Proposition 1.







˜ dTATNT − ˜ d0A0N0
A0N0˜ y0
=
˜ dT(g∗n)T(1 + π) − ˜ d0
˜ y0
. (15)
At the beginning of time 0 external debt jumps from ˜ d0 to ˜ d+
0 = ˜ d0 + ˜ k∗ − ˜ k0 to ﬁnance the initial
increase in capital from ˜ k0 to ˜ k∗. Note that we normalize debt by the level of output before capital
has jumped to ˜ k∗. Next we compute ˜ dT. Dividing (7) by Nt gives the per capita budget constraint
ct + n(kt+1 − dt+1) = R∗(kt − dt) + wt + zkt, (16)
where we have consolidated the terms involving the saving wedge, so that zkt =
τk
1−τkR∗kt is the
lump-sum transfer ﬁnanced by the capital wedge only.
Let us denote by gt = At/At−1 the growth rate of productivity. Then, dividing (16) by At and
using ˜ kt+1 = ˜ kt = ˜ k∗ gives the normalized budget constraint,
˜ ct + ngt+1(˜ k∗ − ˜ dt+1) = R∗(˜ k∗ − ˜ dt) + ˜ w + ˜ zk, (17)
where the wage and transfer per eﬃciency unit of labor are constant and given by ˜ w = (1 − α)˜ k∗α
and ˜ zk =
τk
1−τkR∗˜ k∗.
After time T, the saving wedge disappears and the economy is in a steady growth path with
gt+1 = g∗, ˜ dt = ˜ dT and ˜ ct = ˜ cT. Equation (17) implies
˜ dT = ˜ k
∗ +
˜ w + ˜ zk − ˜ cT
R∗ − ng∗ . (18)











where φ(τs) = (1 − τs)1/γ. The level of net wealth per capita at the beginning of period 0 is
k∗ − d+












(wt + zkt) + R
∗(k0 − d0). (20)










































ng∗ (1 − φ(τs))
.
Using (20), (22) and wt + zkt = ( ˜ w + ˜ zk)A0(1 + πt)g∗t, we then have












(1 + πt) + ˜ k0 − ˜ d0
#
. (23)
The saving wedge τs enters consumption choices only through the marginal propensity to con-
sume out of wealth, (R∗ − ng∗)ψ (τs) ≥ 0. Using (23) it is easy to see that ψ decreases with φ(τs)
and so increases with τs. The marginal propensity to consume increases with the saving wedge.



































t−T (1 + π) − (1 + πt)
i
. (24)
The right-hand side is a closed-form expression for function D in Proposition 1. The signs of
the variations of ∆D/Y0 with the parameters can be derived from the expression above. First,
∆D/Y0 increases with ˜ d0 if and only if ψ(τs)(ng∗φ(τs))
T > 1, which is true if τs is small enough.
Second, ∆D/Y0 increases with π because πt = f(t)π with f(t) ≤ 1 and φ(τs)t−T > 1. Third,
the variation with respect to τs are ambiguous in general and depend on whether ˜ k0 is smaller
or larger than ˜ d0. In the case where ˜ k0 ≥ ˜ d0, ∆D/Y0 is increasing with τs as indicated in the
Proposition. Fourth, ∆D/Y0 unambiguously decreases with ˜ k0. Finally, ∆D/Y0 decreases with τk
if the consumption-saving term is positive.














































(t−T)/γ (1 + π) − (1 + πt)

If there is no saving wedge (τs = 0), then ψ(τs) = φ(τs) = 1 and equation (24) simpliﬁes to
equation (12) in the text.

A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1. The only diﬀerence is that the consumption path
is determined as if future productivity were growing at rate g∗. This implies that consumption at
time t is given by an equation similar to (23) with π set to zero:












(˜ w + ˜ z) + ˜ k
∗ − ˜ dt
!
,
= ˜ w + ˜ z + (R
∗ − ng
∗)(˜ k
∗ − ˜ dt).
Using this expression to substitute ˜ ct out of (17) gives,
˜ k




∗ − ˜ dt),
=
1 + πf(t)
1 + πf(t + 1)
(˜ k
∗ − ˜ dt).
Iterating from t = 0 to t = T gives
˜ k









(˜ k0 − ˜ d0).
Using this expression to substitute out ˜ dT from (15) gives (13). A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.
For t ≥ 1 we have
it =
Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt
Yt
=
At+1Nt+1˜ k∗ − (1 − δ)AtNt˜ k∗
AtNt˜ k∗α = (gt+1n + δ − 1)˜ k∗(1−α).
In period 0 this expression is augmented by a term reﬂecting that the level of capital per eﬃciency
unit of labor jumps up from ˜ k0 to ˜ k∗ at the beginning of the period,




= (g1n + δ − 1)˜ k∗(1−α) +

























˜ k∗ − ˜ k0
˜ kα
0




˜ k∗ − ˜ k0
˜ kα
0
+ (¯ g − g∗)n˜ k∗(1−α) + (g∗n + δ − 1)˜ k∗(1−α),
where ¯ g = 1
T
Pt=T−1
t=0 gt+1 is the average productivity growth rate. Under the additional assumption
that π is small, ¯ g can be expressed as a function of π as



















where the ﬁrst line uses the deﬁnition of πt, and the last equality uses πT = π and π0 = 0. We can










˜ k∗(1−α)g∗n + (g∗n + δ − 1)˜ k∗(1−α).
B Measuring PPP-adjusted Capital Flows.
For a given country, data expressed in constant international dollars (the unit used in the Penn






where CGDPt (RGDPt) is domestic GDP expressed in current (constant) international dollar and
Pt is a price deﬂator. The ratio CGDP/RGDP operates the conversion from constant international
dollar into current international dollar, and P operates the conversion from current international
dollar into current U.S. dollar. We deﬁne the deﬂator P as the price of investment goods reported
in the Penn World Tables, for reasons explained in section 3. Multiplying a variable in constant
international dollar, X, by the deﬂator Q gives its value in terms of current U.S. dollars, X$ = QX.
The deﬂator Q can be used to obtain PPP-adjusted estimates of the observed cumulated capital






t,33 and use the formulas DT = D$


















The estimate of the initial net external debt in U.S. dollar (D$
0) is obtained from Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2006)’s External Wealth of Nations Mark II database (EWN), as the diﬀerence
between (the opposite of) the reported net international investment position (NIIP) and the errors
and omissions (EO) cumulated between 1970 and 1980.34 The same approach is used to construct
estimates of the initial debt output ratio d0/y0, which we need to compute the right-hand-side of
(11).











t is the current U.S. dollar value of the net overseas assistance in year t from all

























33Alternatively, one could use Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006)’s estimate of the net external
position in year 2000. The diﬀerence between the two estimates lies in the treatment of valuation
eﬀects due to asset price and currency movements. The size and relative importance of these
valuation eﬀects has increased over time. We do not attempt to incorporate these eﬀects in this
paper.
34In keeping with usual practice, we interpret errors and omissions as unreported capital inﬂows.C Data
Table 4: Data for 65 non-OECD countries, as well as Korea, Mexico and Turkey. The table reports
the sample period for each country (Start and End), the average growth rate of the working-
age population n, the average investment rate ik, the average productivity growth rate g , the
productivity catch-up parameter π, the capital wedge τk, the saving wedge τs, and the capital
wedge-adjusted marginal product of capital (RW).
Country Start End n(%) ik(%) g(%) π τk(%) τs(%) RW(%)
Angola 1985 1996 2.85 6.16 -2.32 -0.36 12.92 5.76 6.29
Argentina 1980 2000 1.49 15.84 0.83 -0.15 2.90 1.24 6.04
Bangladesh 1980 2000 2.62 10.41 1.73 0.02 13.99 -0.07 5.92
Benin 1980 2000 3.02 8.00 -0.00 -0.28 19.41 1.83 7.77
Bolivia 1980 2000 2.46 8.38 -0.23 -0.32 12.51 2.43 4.75
Botswana 1980 1999 3.56 16.95 3.84 0.47 11.07 -2.85 4.70
Brazil 1980 2000 2.38 18.00 0.43 -0.23 2.70 1.51 5.79
Cameroon 1980 1995 2.80 8.72 -1.22 -0.37 17.74 3.26 1.06
Chile 1980 2000 1.85 17.32 2.88 0.28 6.57 -1.30 3.25
China 1982 2000 1.82 19.58 4.81 0.74 7.69 -3.68 4.00
Colombia 1980 2000 2.61 11.79 0.74 -0.18 11.42 1.15 3.23
Congo, Rep. 1980 2000 2.90 12.95 3.17 0.28 6.78 -0.78 11.10
Costa Rica 1980 2000 3.02 15.30 -0.58 -0.36 6.21 2.45 5.74
Cyprus 1980 1996 1.08 23.57 5.59 0.84 1.43 -3.74 6.84
Cˆ ote d’Ivoire 1980 2000 3.70 5.74 -1.40 -0.46 17.09 3.93 10.26
Dominican Republic 1980 2000 2.61 13.26 1.57 -0.02 9.82 0.13 7.86
Ecuador 1980 2000 3.08 16.50 -0.47 -0.37 3.40 2.88 4.35
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1980 2000 2.62 7.42 2.73 0.24 23.81 -1.19 9.50
El Salvador 1980 2000 2.28 7.10 -1.01 -0.41 16.90 2.95 5.89
Ethiopia 1980 2000 2.61 4.17 -0.50 -0.35 32.68 2.38 6.68
Fiji 1980 1999 1.65 12.64 1.10 -0.10 5.83 1.04 8.63
Gabon 1980 2000 2.44 11.53 1.14 -0.10 8.61 0.78 8.75
Ghana 1980 2000 3.40 6.11 1.14 -0.10 17.44 1.13 10.84
Guatemala 1980 2000 2.76 7.35 0.26 -0.25 18.65 1.72 4.38
Haiti 1980 1998 2.09 5.46 2.25 0.14 31.63 -0.77 43.30
Honduras 1980 2000 3.44 12.91 -1.26 -0.46 8.35 3.46 2.11
Hong Kong, China 1980 2000 1.87 25.31 3.56 0.41 2.49 -2.42 3.47
India 1980 2000 2.33 11.95 3.04 0.31 13.01 -1.37 5.46
Indonesia 1981 2000 2.46 16.91 1.74 0.00 9.75 -0.33 1.18
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1980 2000 3.10 19.84 -0.07 -0.28 1.20 2.33 9.72
Israel 1980 2000 2.72 24.97 1.88 0.03 0.09 0.06 5.17
continued on next pageTable 4 continued from previous page
Country Start End n(%) ik(%) g(%) π τk(%) τs(%) RW(%)
Jamaica 1980 2000 1.80 15.39 -0.62 -0.37 0.25 2.98 5.75
Jordan 1980 2000 5.09 15.57 -1.12 -0.44 9.98 3.29 2.90
Kenya 1980 2000 3.70 8.33 0.76 -0.18 14.43 1.48 6.27
Korea, Rep. 1980 2000 1.83 34.05 4.13 0.61 -0.08 -3.86 4.33
Madagascar 1980 2000 2.84 2.75 -1.50 -0.47 38.59 3.59 8.64
Malawi 1980 2000 2.64 9.24 1.84 0.04 10.56 0.26 14.05
Malaysia 1980 2000 3.07 24.42 2.65 0.21 4.31 -1.39 3.51
Mali 1980 2000 2.44 7.83 -0.08 -0.29 18.46 1.98 8.29
Mauritius 1980 2000 1.62 11.96 3.85 0.53 11.66 -2.14 6.76
Mexico 1980 2000 2.95 18.13 -0.74 -0.39 3.34 2.81 5.35
Morocco 1980 2000 2.75 12.74 0.86 -0.16 7.91 1.17 5.55
Mozambique 1980 2000 1.93 3.07 -2.52 -0.56 36.89 4.58 7.86
Nepal 1980 2000 2.29 15.45 0.64 -0.18 8.65 1.12 4.49
Niger 1980 1995 3.28 6.65 -1.58 -0.38 13.88 4.16 10.50
Nigeria 1980 2000 2.93 8.31 -1.82 -0.50 14.90 3.91 -2.51
Pakistan 1980 2000 2.57 11.34 3.20 0.34 14.14 -1.34 4.65
Panama 1980 2000 2.64 18.36 0.09 -0.28 3.00 1.58 3.35
Papua New Guinea 1980 1999 2.86 11.18 -0.19 -0.29 9.34 2.17 5.03
Paraguay 1980 2000 3.23 12.78 0.31 -0.24 11.90 1.49 2.07
Peru 1980 2000 2.63 18.02 -1.20 -0.44 1.14 3.74 5.97
Philippines 1980 2000 2.73 14.95 -0.40 -0.34 5.84 2.32 5.80
Rwanda 1980 2000 2.96 4.34 -2.99 -0.62 33.93 5.31 3.10
Senegal 1980 2000 2.88 6.50 0.03 -0.28 19.25 2.09 7.98
Singapore 1980 1996 2.94 44.14 4.29 0.50 -2.48 -5.92 6.14
South Africa 1980 2000 2.86 9.52 -0.25 -0.33 9.24 2.44 8.58
Sri Lanka 1980 2000 1.91 13.45 1.33 -0.06 10.57 0.18 4.99
Syrian Arab Republic 1980 2000 3.92 11.64 1.69 -0.00 13.04 0.13 8.12
Taiwan Province of China 1981 1998 1.46 19.10 5.43 0.85 7.86 -4.71 3.33
Tanzania 1980 2000 3.27 18.89 -1.39 -0.46 -0.96 4.50 9.05
Thailand 1980 2000 2.18 31.30 3.64 0.46 0.04 -2.36 3.96
Togo 1980 2000 2.92 7.47 -2.71 -0.59 16.06 5.26 0.46
Trinidad and Tobago 1980 2000 1.57 10.18 -0.76 -0.39 10.06 2.75 7.69
Tunisia 1980 2000 2.89 14.41 2.19 0.09 7.83 -0.30 6.70
Turkey 1980 2000 2.76 16.87 0.54 -0.21 5.96 1.19 3.07
Uganda 1980 2000 2.65 2.84 0.86 -0.15 51.47 0.87 -0.94
Uruguay 1980 2000 0.66 11.65 2.37 0.15 7.61 -0.63 5.72
Venezuela, RB 1980 2000 2.86 14.35 -1.48 -0.47 1.71 4.06 6.74